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Otto Neurath has become a key figure in the historical re-
consideration of logical empiricism. Neurath’s work clearly 
departs from textbook presentations of positivism and is 
characterized by a strict anti-foundationalism, focus on the 
special sciences, and political activism. A closer considera-
tion of Neurath’s philosophy and his campaign for the “Unity 
of Science” is highly relevant for contemporary philosophy 
of science. On the one hand, Neurath’s ideals of unification 
and physicalism provide clear links to postwar analytic phi-
losophy. On the other hand, Neurath’s non-reductive and 
anti-metaphysical account challenges orthodox models of 
ontological and theoretical unification. The edited volume 
Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science not only aims at set-
ting historical records straight but also at evaluating the rele-
vance of Neurath’s project for contemporary controversies 
about unification. Part I is concerned with historical aspects 
and includes a previously unpublished essay by Neurath as 
well seven articles on Neurath in his historical context. Part 
II focuses on current debates and includes nine essays on the 
prospects of unification in science. 
The first part begins with Neurath’s essay “Unity of Science 
and Logical Empiricism”, that was written as a response to 
Horkheimer’s attack on positivism in the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung (1937). Neurath sent the manuscript to 
Horkheimer in New York but the latter refused to publish 
it in the Zeitschrift. This previously unpublished essay and 
Karlheinz Barck’s helpful commentary provide an excellent 
starting point for the discussion of Neurath’s ideal of unifi-
cation. Jan Sebestik’s and Olga Pombo’s articles show that 
Neurath’s unity has little to do with the reductive physicalism 
of postwar analytic philosophy. Neurath does not understand 
unification in terms of reduction to a fundamental physical 
theory but in terms of an encyclopedic model. As Sebestik 
puts it: “Although the Encyclopedia is written in the unified 
language, it is pluralist [because] it sets out partial and local 
systematizations, sometimes even in competition with each 
other” (55). 
The first part of the book not only develops a nuanced pic-
ture of Neurath’s work but also of its relation to other logical 
empiricists. Ahri-Veikko Pietarinen’s contribution focuses 
on the differences between Carnap’s and Neurath’s accounts 
of language while Thomas Bonk discusses three different 
accounts of “reality” in the philosophy of Schlick, Carnap 
and Neurath. Finally, Gideon Freudenthal and Tatiana Ka-
rachentsev offer a detailed account of the almost forgotten 
Gregorius Itelson, who influenced Neurath during his time 
in Berlin. Taken together, the articles constitute a fascinating 
mosaic of the historical Neurath and challenge common phi-
losophical alliances and differences. The clearest example of 
this is the article “Keeping track of Neurath’s Bill” by Sheldon 
Steed, Gabriele Contessa and Nancy Cartwright. The authors 
defend Cartwright’s pluralist and anti-reductionist account 
of a “dappled world” in classical physics. However, Neurath’s 
unity of science does not appear as an opponent but rather 
as a potential ally in this pluralist framework. Cartwright et 
al. argue that Neurath’s “view of unity [...] resonates with 
the focus of this paper, a view that attempts to make sense 
of the domain of scientific inquiry while doing justice to the 
ambiguities and uncertainties that science necessarily leaves 
untreated” (97).
The collection of historical articles continues a trend of re-
describing Neurath as a politically engaged encyclopedist 
who has little in common with caricatures of positivism (cf. 
Cartwright et al 1996). While this historical reconsideration 
is well-justified, there is also a risk of presenting Neurath’s 
philosophy as far more moderate and conciliatory than it was 
intended to be. The editors introduce Neurath’s unity pro-
gram by arguing that his “goal with regard to the encyclope-
dia was relatively simple: to build a useful tool for reciprocal 
cooperation and understanding among scientists” (5). One 
may worry that this presentation smoothes the edges of Neu-
rath’s philosophy too much and leaves too little of Neurath’s 
self-described “radical standpoint” (1983, 51) and “scientism 
[that] knows no ’philosophy’, ‘no epistemology’ with special 
propositions” (1983, 115).
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In fact, Neurath’s disagreements with Horkheimer would 
provide an excellent starting point for a consideration of 
Neurath’s more radical claims that go beyond mere praise of 
interdisciplinarity and will still raise philosophical eyebrows. 
For example, in his response to Horkheimer, Neurath not 
only requires that “all scientific theories are testable on the 
basis of sentences which contain only space-time related ex-
pressions’” (25) but also questions the intelligibility of many 
projects in traditional and critical theory (24). Unfortunately, 
only Sebestik’s contribution engages with the controversial 
elements of Neurath’s philosophy and none of the articles 
attempts to extend the nuanced historical perspective to 
Neurath’s critics. Instead, non-positivist contemporaries 
only make an appearance as “anti-modernist and roman-
tic thinkers” who promoted “misology and obscurantism” 
(1). Of course, this does not do justice to a philosopher like 
Horkheimer whose early materialism overlapped with Neu-
rath’s positivism (cf. Korthals 1985) and who combined his 
attack on the Vienna Circle with a critique of an “anti-scienti-
fic perspective” that “escapes in metaphysical dreams”. “The 
trivialization of science acts as an opiate in private life and as 
a fraud in society” (Horkheimer 1937, 8-9). It also doesn’t do 
justice to the broader debates about the relation of science 
and society in interwar Germany (e.g. Harrington 1999). 
Neurath’s philosophy proposed a controversial “scienti-
fic world-conception, which absorbs everything that can be 
experienced” (Neurath 1983, 32). He did not only endorse 
a moderate ideal of interdisciplinarity and he did not only 
reject overt spiritualism and romanticism. The collection of 
historical essays continues important work in developing 
an alternative to old caricatures of positivism and stresses 
similarities with contemporary philosophy of scientific prac-
tice. However, it does not grasp the opportunity of using 
the Horkheimer-response to advance current debates (e.g. 
O’Neill and Ueberl 2004, Richardson 2009) through a clo-
ser look at the controversial aspects of Neurath’s unification 
campaign. 
The second part of Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science 
discusses the prospects of unification in contemporary phi-
losophy of science. Postwar philosophy moved away from 
the Neurathian version of unity by focusing on theory reduc-
tion and ontological physicalism. Given that the mainstream 
of philosophy of science has grown increasingly skeptical of 
reductionist and ontological formulations of scientific unity, 
a reconsideration of Neurath is well-deserved. 
The articles of the second part provide a range of competing 
perspectives on unification. Daniel Andler’s proposal of a “fe-
deralist conception” of unity strongly overlaps with Neurath 
while Robert Causey insists on a reductive picture “even if an 
ultimate ‘super science’ may not be achievable” (170). Mario 
Bunge suggests that science is unified because it studies “a 
single reality” with a “single general method” (145) while Jan 
Woleński describes science as unified through a moderate 
naturalism (196). Furthermore, Ángel Nepomuceno, Fernan-
do Soler, and Atocha Aliseda try to find unity in the shared 
logical tools of the sciences (210). Finally, the contributions 
by Juan Manuel Torres, Hossein Sheykh Rezaee and Andrés 
Rivadulla all suggest that discussions of unity and disunity 
may require a more specific look at individual disciplines or 
types of special science laws.
The disagreement among the authors on how to characterize 
scientific unity is striking and provides a helpful illustration 
of the current state of debate. “Unity” is obviously a highly 
ambiguous term that can be specified in terms of diverse 
epistemic, metaphysical, methodological, and social features. 
The real challenge is to come up with a specification that is 
not only plausible but also philosophically interesting. It is 
somewhat surprising that only Andler contributes to current 
attempts (e.g. Potochnik 2011) to revive Neurath’s model 
of “encyclopedic unity”. The reluctance of most authors to 
adopt a Neurathian model reflects the difficulty that mere 
endorsements of encyclopedism and interdisciplinarity do 
not provide a sufficiently challenging notion of unification in 
contemporary philosophy of science. At least two responses 
are possible. On the one hand, one can follow Carlos Ulises 
Moulines’ contribution that rejects the availability of a notion 
of “unified science” that is still philosophically relevant. On 
the other hand, one may also argue that Neurath’s notion 
of unity provides resources beyond interdisciplinarity that 
remain challenging in contemporary philosophy of science. 
However, this would require a stronger focus on Neurath’s 
genuinely controversial claims, such as the emancipatory 
function of a “scientific world-conception” and the firm rejec-
tion of supposedly unscientific ways of thinking in academia 
and everyday life. Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science 
does not settle these issues and does not leave the reader with 
a clear sense of direction in current unity debates. However, 
the book provides an intriguing diversity of perspectives that 
illustrates the relevance of a continued debate about the pros-
pects of scientific unification. 
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